Speculations on the Relevance of International Law to the Needs of Black Southern Africa by Richardson, Henry J., III
Maurer School of Law: Indiana University
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty Faculty Scholarship
1970
Speculations on the Relevance of International Law
to the Needs of Black Southern Africa
Henry J. Richardson III
Indiana University School of Law - Bloomington
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the African Studies Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty
Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Articles by Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Richardson, Henry J. III, "Speculations on the Relevance of International Law to the Needs of Black Southern Africa" (1970). Articles
by Maurer Faculty. Paper 2215.
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/2215
-22-
SPECULATIONS ON THE RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
TO THE NEEDS OF BLACK SOUTHERN AFRICA 
by Henry J. Richardson III 
The liberation of some thirty million black people subjugated by 
White Southern Africa {WSA) remains the overriding priority, and the 
entire region, save for some sections of South Africa, is in dire need 
of development for the welfare of Its peoples. Hany of the apparent 
solutions to these imperatives lie either in the realm of currently 
unavailable military force and strategy or are contingent upon outs ide 
technical and economic resources allocated by rich but stingy govern-
ments on political grounds. In this context, it may be questioned 
whether an international lega l system bereft of organized coercion to 
enforce Its writ, and notoriously porous concerning questions of force 
and violence, has any role at all to play In ameliorating the needs of 
Black Southern Africa (BSA). 
The question is indeed a valid one , but not because of the Inability 
of the International community to make its law heard against the mili-
tary thunder of both great and medium-sized states. Al l domestic legal 
systems, almost by definition, become Inadequate when {9roe ~eure 
overwhelms the institutions of state authority. Nor in times of peace 
does law enforcement depend upon strict deterrence for general public 
obedience to the spirit of the law. Rather it depends on a respect 
held by the majority of the populace for those known principles consti-
tuting the law, which is in turn buttressed by a loose consensus on the 
primary moral attitudes underpinning that particular society. This 
general internalized respect for law based on moral consensus manages 
in times free from unusual stress to cover the society's activities 
like a frayed three-quarter length blanket, leaving enough uncovered 
in the way of violators to keep police, prosecutors, judges and prison 
wardens busy, but usually not overwhelmed. The same is more or less 
accurate for the international community. There ts behavior that rolls 
along regulated by principles of international law which are obeyed 
almost as a matter of course, such as the law of diplomatic privileges 
and Immunities, the law of the high seas, the conventions and regulations 
governing international aviation, and even much of the law of treaties. 
But uncovered by the blanket is proportionately somewhat more behavior 
than in a long-standing, reasonably stable domestic legal system, in-
cluding that which might be regulated by the law relating to the justi-
fied use of force by states under the U.N. Charter, the definitions of 
self-defense and aggression, the law relating to the sovereignty of a 
state over its own domestic resources, and the law concerning state 
responsibility towards aliens and their property. So the question for 
international law in Southern Africa concerns not its existence, but 
its adequacy to meet those present and future problems in that region 
-------·---~-·--~ '-------
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that could possibly be met or ameliorated by a generally agreed body 
of principles, processes, and implementing arrangements. 
The conception of international law here borrows heavily from both 
Professors Myres McDougal and Richard Falk: the process of authoritative 
decision which in its outcomes results in a system of principles and 
implementing arrangements founded on expectations in the international 
community as to what is legally permissible and what is not. These 
expectations, of course, are subject to multiple political, economic, 
social and cultural factors, not the least of which are racial attitudes. 
The latter seems clear enough, in relation to black people in both 
Southern Africa and the United States, to advance the proposition that 
there is an analogy between international law in the Southern African 
context and civil rights law in the United States. Such an analogy 
promises to be useful in illuminating the challenges confronting inter-
national law relative to Black Southern Africa. This analogy is rele-
vant because the similarities of context which it implies are increasingly 
recognized and felt by many black people in both areas. Explicit con-
sciousness of similarities in their condition has existed between the 
intelligentsia of black America and West Africa since the late 19th 
century, and this has grown into a recognition of at least symbolic 
unity due in large part to the Garveyite Movement, the ancestral slavery 
origins, and the recognition of the common racial bond in Black American 
and somewhat less in West African literature. Similar contacts with 
Southern Africa were more rare, although the young preacher, John 
Chilembwe, sponsored by the African Methodist Episcopal Church, returned 
home to Hyasaland from the United States to lead and be killed in the 
first nationalist uprising in that territory in 1910, an event now a 
solid part of Malawi nationalist tradition. More recently, black Amer-
ican consciousness of racism in South Africa has been stirred by the 
presence of South African refugee students attending American univer-
sities on U.S. Government fellowships, the anti-apartheid campaign in 
the United Nations, and South African brutality such as in Sharpeville 
and the Terrorist Trials. Also representatives of the African Nationa-
list Congress and other Southern African liberation movements have 
appealed to the black community as well as to white liberal groups for aid. 
To understand the relevance of these interactions to international 
law, another significant similarity must be noted. rn Southern Africa, 
the meaning of black-ruled states attaining legal independence and the 
recognition of their sovereignty did not include freedom from the threat 
of either domestic or trans-national white domination. rn most of Africa 
north of the Rovuma River, the legal expiration of British rule generally 
left the new states with sufficient resources to assure their unquestioned 
political dominance over the white settler and civil servant groups, as 
for example in Kenya and Tanzania. rn the economic sector, however, so 
much of the investment capital, management and private economic policy-
making still rests in European and American hands 1n most independent 
African countries as to be disquieting in the extreme. 
In Southern Africa, however, the magnitude of the "white problem• 
takes a quantum jump. The emergence into independence of the Black 
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Southern African states had no impact on the legal status and the 
political and military realities of Southern Rhodesia, Portuguese-con-
trol led Mozambique and Angola, South Africa, and Southwest Africa. The 
military forces in the white redoubt are far superior to any available 
in Black Southern Africa, or for that matter, in all of Black Africa 
combined. The policies pursued in all of these territories rest on the 
twin assumptions of the inferiority of the African and the white psy-
cholo!ical and economic need for him to remain in a subservient posi-
tion - policies inherently antithetical to the assumptions at the heart 
of African independence. Further, domestic white power within each 
newly independent state was not as significantly diminished as was the 
case to the North. At independence, each of these states had a deficit 
of nationals sufficiently trained to take over governmental administra-
·tion. The new governments, therefore, had little choice but to retain 
most of the British colonial civil servants in positions of influence 
in order to be able to run the country, an arrangement facilitated by 
post-independence British aid, secondment and development programs. 
In addition, the capital sectors of each of these national economies 
are dominated by foreign capital from Britain, Rhodesia, South Africa, 
and the U.S .• This means that in each country there is a substantial 
white expatriate group with heavy influence in governmental and econo-
mic affairs, but without legal responsibility or public accountability. 
These groups have substantial personal contacts with each other across 
state lines, and with the dominant whites in Southern Rhodesia and 
South Africa. "Islands of civilization in a black sea" is the prevailing 
attitude. This means that there is an effective white network of in-
fluence throughout Southern Africa often operating outjide of govern-
mental channels, against the opposition of which any black-controlled 
government has a difficult, if not impossible time of effectively 1m-
posing social or economic policies, even though Africans form the vast 
majority of the regional population. 
In America, former black slaves have fought from one to another 
subservient position relative to the white American ••Jority, under 
conditions by now notorious. Black America is sequestered in the inter-
stices of white society, with its numbers concentrated in mid-town urban 
ghettos and southern farms and share-holdings. In 1970, white America 
dominates politically and economically, and it now uses the repressive 
instruments of state power increasingly openly against blacks and lately 
a variety of other dissident groups who actively protest their condition 
and defend their life styles. 
If we look at the legal position of the black man in the law of 
the United States in light of his relative position in the American 
economy, and then look at the legal position of Black Southern Africa 
and African states general ly in international law in light of their 
relative position in the international economy, a parallel emerges . 
For both groups there have been significant legal changes granting their 
peoples and organizations additional protective political rights and 
formal legal equality with their former legal masters. The law in both 
contexts has moved through its legislative processes (admittedly imperfect, 
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111-deffned, and yet to fully emerge in the international community) 
to proclaim a fundamental change in socfal policy towards black people. 
Yet in both contexts the monkey of white domination remains on the backs 
of those supposedly liberated. And fn both instances, this domination 
fs maintained primarily through heavy fnstftuttonal influence on or 
control of economic instrumentalities, coupled with naked coercive 
force still applied with some restraint. 
Relative to Southern Africa (and to Black Africa as a whole) the 
international legislative liberation began tn 1945 with the provisions 
affirming the maintenance of human dignity tn the Atlantic Charter 
which captured the hopes of colonized peoples around the world. These 
provisions were subsequently affirmed as principles in Part II of the 
U.N. Charter, the nearest equivalent to a general constitution tn the 
international community. In 1948, the first resolution against South 
African apartheid was introduced in the U.N. General Assembly by India, 
the nearest though imperfect equivalent to an international legislature. 
The same year saw the appearance of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights as a General Assembly resolution which, while not legally binding 
on any state, has now become a statement of political rights so widely 
recognized that no state dare openly disavow ft. The European Commission 
on Human Rights founded fn 1950 provided hope that effective fnstftu-
ttonal arrangements might evolve on a wide international scale to pro-
tect such rights, and indeed the efficacity of those particular arrange-
ments has expanded to include quasi-judicial determination of violations 
of such rights in Europe. Under the prodding of successively independent 
African states, the U.N. General Assembly passed scores of resolutions 
condemning apartheid, questioning the legitimacy of continuing South 
Africa's mandate over Southwest Africa, and fn the process, spotlighting 
the abstentions and negative votes of the United States, Britain and 
France in conjunction with those of South Africa and Portugal. 
This continuing hammering at the theme that discrimination within 
a state on the basts of color should be a basis of international con-
demnation produced hearfngs on conditions fn South Africa by special 
subcommittees of the U.N., and the proposal of an increasing number of 
International multilateral treaties on human rights . Perhaps the most 
significant of these is the International Convention to Eliminate all 
Forms of Racial Discrimination, which was proposed in 1965 and came 
into force fn 1968. It fs significant that (1) this convention provides 
for institutional machinery to receive tndfvtdual grievances and ulti-
mately to publicize violations in states-party, and (2) that the U.S. 
felt constrained to adhere to ft. The most important indication of a 
shift in great power attitude was the determination by the U.N. Security 
Council without a veto that white domination fn Southern Rhodesia con-
stituted a threat to international peace and security under Chapter VII 
of the U.N. Charter, and the consequent authorizing of economic sanctions. 
In the same year (1966), the International Court of Justice fn handing 
down the Southwest Africa decision, came excruciatingly close to deciding 
that the cumulative legal effect of the foregoing international opposi-
tion to racial discrimination and apartheid had created a rule of custo-
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mary international law against such actfvfties in the domestic or inter-
national arenas. Its failure to do so has clearly damaged the prestige 
of the Court. At the present tfme, the fight against apartheid and 
for more effecti ve legal protection of human rights continues with the 
General Assembly's revocation of the South African mandate over South-
west Africa and the activities of non-governmental groups such as the 
International Commission of Jurists. The recently proposed International 
Covenant on Social and Economic Rights and the International Covenant 
on Polftfcal and Social Rights are additional relevant pieces of inter-
national legislation. The former see~s to be the ffrst major multila-
teral treaty explicitly recognizing the Intimate link between political 
rights and economic opportunity and based on the tacit assumption that 
both should be guaranteed within the framework of international law. 
The point made by the foregoing incomplete recitation is that the 
decentralized mechanisms whfch approximate a legislative process in the 
international community have moved and said that racial discrimination 
and especially apartheid are wrong and should be condemned under law 
when perpetrated by any state government. Whether thfs principle yet 
forms part of customary International law fs stfll fn dispute; an In-
creasing number of international legal scholars affirm that it does. 
But it is clear that the proclaimed moral attitudes of the international 
community condemn racial discrimination. The geographical cockpit of 
thfs intense struggle has been Southern Africa as much as anywhere. 
In the United States, the struggle of black people to free them-
selves from slavery and its remnants was untfl recently primarily con-
ceived as a succession of legislative and judicial goals to be attained. 
The Dred Soott decision of the Supreme Court holding essentially that 
the black man had no rights as a person but only status as chattel, was 
reversed by the post cfv11 war Cfv f1 Rights Acts of 1866 and the 13th, 
14th, and 15th amendments to the Constitution which respectively out-
lawed slavery, granted the black man citizenship, due process and equal 
protection of the law, and gave him the ri9ht to vote. These amendments 
also abrogated the provision in Article I l2) of the same Constitution 
declaring that one Negro was three-fifths of a whfte man . But after 
Reconstruction, there followed a long period of legislative and judi-
cial evasion on the basfs of reinstituted white control of the South 
whfch effectively nullified these ri ghts and returned the black man in 
the South to peonage. The Black Codes of each southern and some northern 
states and the Supreme Court's Ptleey decision of 1896 promulgating the 
doctrine of "separate but equal" reflected this complete subjugation. 
Meanwhile, his brethren migrating north discovered that thefr general 
destiny was in the urban ghetto, legal rights notwithstanding. 
After World War I, the NAACP, founded in 1909, began to lay the judicial foundation for further protecting the black man's body from 
lynching and hfs access to education, voting, due process of law, and 
equal housing. After a long series of gradually favorable decisions 
by the Supreme Court during the late 1930's and 1940's, the Court held 
- - - ---~~---
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In the milestone B~ decision In 1954 that segregated education was 
Inherently unequal and must be abolished with all deliberate speed, 
thus overturning the separate but equal doctrine of Pteesy. Brown 
produced another period of attempts by the South to nullify this pro-
gress, all of which were successively and laboriously overturned by 
the Supreme Court. Meanwhile In 1957, a first timid civil rights bill 
was passed by Congress establishing the U.S. Civil Rights Commission 
and giving very limited powers to the Justice Department to enforce 
voting rights. This had been preceded In 1955 by Hartin luther King's 
Montgomery Bus Boycott and a Supreme Court decision confirming its 
legality. In 1960, the era of black mass demonstrations began with the 
aim of wiping out racial discrimination In public places. Shortly 
thereafter, a campaign was begun In the South to register black voters 
under guerrilla warfare conditions by the Student Nonviolent Coordinating 
Committee on the partial basts of a 1962 Supreme Court decision ordering 
legislative reapportionment on the basis of population. In 1964, Con-
gress passed the Public Accommodations Act outlawing racial discrimina-
tion In all public places participating in inter-state commerce. In 
1965, the Voting Rights Bill was passed reaffirming the right of black 
people to vote under the 15th Amendment and giving the Justice Depart-
ment increased powers to enforce those rights. Thfs legislation was 
augmented by various Supreme Court decisions and a Constitutional amend-
ment forbidding states to impose a poll tax as a voting qualification. 
In 1968, Congress passed legislation outlawing racial discrimination 
In all federally financed housing, but only under the tragic prodding 
of the assassination of Martin luther King. 
In 1964, the Federal Government discovered poverty in the cities, 
and was soon made uncomfortably aware that the majority of the urban 
poor were black . The Poverty Act of 1964 created the Office of Economic 
Opportunity which has publicly studied "the poor" to an excruciating 
extent, but has not appreciably relieved black poverty. The revealed 
enormity of the problem coupled with rising black consciousness and 
VIet-generated social discontent squarely raised the question of the 
budgetary and resource priorities of the United States' white majority. 
That question remains unanswered today - ie., whether the effective and 
authoritative decision makers in the political, social and economic 
processes will devote sufficient resources to effectively eradicate 
this complex of problems which Is impossible without eradicating racial 
discrimination. Meanwhile, the country Is in crisis as now black Ameri-
cans have realized that though their legislative goals have been won, 
they are relatively, in terms of their personal welfare and opportunities 
in an ever-rich economy, no better off than before, and in some cases 
worse off. Their attempts to go to the heart of the matter by questioning 
local and national priorities In allocating resources have brought little 
substantive response, a backlash psychology among the white majority and 
general refusal to effectively implement existing programs, and the 
Increasing use of the coercive Instruments of the State to subdue them 
and their allies. 
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Thus , in both the American and international arenas, the legisla-
tive process or its equivalent has responded to protest by rectifying 
inequality in the law by reasserting the validity of agreed human and 
political rights. However, the net result has been that black people 
in both contexts (and many other people also) are now flatly faced with 
their own awareness that political ri ghts mean little without access to 
and influence on those institutions controlling wealth and other values 
needed to give such rights content - eg. to provide economic opportunity . 
They face the further awareness that those holding effective power over 
the necessary resources -white people in America, the rich Western 
countries in the world - will generally transfer them only under their 
own nationalistic and self-serving conditions. The primary need of all 
Africa, especially of Southern Africa, is to develop for the benefit 
of its peoples. This process requires large infusions of economic and 
technical resources, most of which is controlled on an incremental basis 
by rich countries or by international institutions dominated by the same. 
Investment as a source of capital is similarly controlled by large cor-
porations closely allied with rich governments, and their predominance 
in the economies of many African countries has already been mentioned. 
Some of these same corporations in America control much of the private 
investment capital needed to develop Black America. 
This was the stark situation presented by UNCTAD I and II in 1964 
and lg68 where 75 developing nations documented conclusively the fact 
that their development was impossible as a group in the context of 
present world economic conditions, allocations, and institutional ar-
rangements, and proposed modified marketing arrangements , institutions, 
and aid principles and practices. The primary response of the United 
States was to de liver an ominous warning about the undesirable conse-
quences of trying to coerce it and the other rich nations by using 
voting majorities in International institutions, coupled with little 
substantive consideration of the problems presented. 
A second analogy between the American and Southern African contexts 
is relevant here. In both situations full-scale open sustained violence 
by black people against those who dominate or hinder their development 
Is somewhat unlikely and would probably be counter-productive against 
overwhelming white-controlled military forces. However, the possibility 
exists, and a situation of sporadic guerrilla warfare has developed in 
both contexts in response to white violence by both authoritative and 
non-authoritative means. In America, the activities of the Panthers, 
Black Nationalists, SNCC, etc. are at the same time vocalizing and 
acting out the inner fee l ings of many black Americans who for many 
reasons do not presently wish to take such action themselves, but who 
may give other support. In Southern Africa, the activities of freedom 
fighters against the coordinated military forces of South Africa, Southern 
Rhodesia and Portugal are reflecting the deepest sentiments of the ma-jority of black Southern Africans (vide the strength of the national ist 
opposition wi thin Malawi and lesotho and the very enthusiastic reception 
given to Kaunda when he preached revolution in Botswana In 1967), at the 
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same time when the black governments of these countries feel compelled 
for their own preservation to resist overt actiyities against South 
Africa and Portugal and choose to accept aid or trade f r om them. Al-
though the situations in both of these contexts may r ise and ebb over 
the short run. the intensity of injustice to black people and resent-
ment of the same against continued prejudice on all levels is such that 
some kind of violent social upheaval or continuing corrosive violence 
are distinct possibilities. 
In light of all the above, l awmakers and the holders of effective 
power are faced wl th the very rea 1 ques t1 on of whether they will become 
effectively responsive to the needs of these two groups of black citizens 
of these respective communities. That is , whether after having affirmed 
and granted certain needed political rights and protection for them 1n 
domestic legislation and international treaties, procedures will now be 
legislated or otherwise approved in l aw for conferring real economic 
and other benefits so these rights tan be effectively Implemented and 
enjoyed on a day-to-day basis. Or, al ternatively whether law and law-
makers In both eontexts will not effectively respond, thereby raising 
the probability of (1) Increasing the level of unauthorized violence 
and disruption of minimum order, (2) confirming the moral bankruptcy of 
the community through the constant violation by its effective decision-
makers of Its own publ icly expressed governing assumptions and moral 
postulates, and (3) accelerating a modification of those assumptions and 
postulates towards some kind of fascism with apartheid objectives. 
Thus, we have facing International law, as the decentralized system 
of regulation and normative guidance serving the International community, 
a profound challenge to legislate (or quasi-legislate) and implement the 
economic confirmation of those human rights already recognized as arong 
Its highest principles . This must be done on a global scale, because 
the substance-matter of the challenge - racial discrimination, economic 
deprivation , the weakness of being poor - is world-wide. If we once 
again focus on Southern Africa, several regional challenges can be iden-
tified to which a revised system of international law must effectively 
relate. The imperatives of this region cannot be neatly categorized 
into "legal", "political", "economic", "social", and "moral" problems; 
they interlock Into all these nomenclatures and into each other across 
a very broad spectrum of behavior. But certain tasks can be identified. 
The first such task of International law is for its decision-makers 
and institutions to continue the search for effective strategies to 
dismember the system of apartheid in South and Southwest Africa, and 
closely related, to dismember the colonialist and racist regimes of 
Portugal-in-Africa and Rhodesia. Economic sanctions under Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter have been partly effective, but have lacked staying 
power. At the least, a more effective reporting and policing system is 
needed to patrol for sanction violators. Also the scope of sanctions 
needs to be effectively extended into the area of International credit 
financing , and into the area of exempting the object of the sanctions 
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from world-wide economic policies nominally having little apparent con-
nection with that state, e.g . exempting South Africa from all benefits 
under the recent decision of the International Monetary Fund to support 
the price of gold at $35 per ounce. 
Pending the completion of the first task, the second task is to 
confirm the general legality of the Southern African liberation move-
ments (not necessarily of all liberation movements) as organizations 
with overwhelming popular encouragement in the region battling for the 
two principles i n the world community that have been clearly condemned , 
ie., apartheid and colonialism. Doubtless some standard of proof would 
have to be established to fix the aims and strategies of these movements, 
and also to show that change towards a public order of human dignity in 
this region will arrive via no other route. The meeting of such a bur-
den of proof would possibly encourage states to aid these movements 
overtly instead of through the covert channels now employed (except by 
Zambia and Tanzania) and for governments to openly deal with them on 
some basis short of diplomatic recognition as a method of denying legi-
timacy to WSA. 
A doctrina l solution to this problem has traditionally been sought 
in the context of Articles 2 (4) and 51 of the U.N. Charter with their 
prohibitions on the use of force in the international community except 
for "self-defense" against "aggression". And as may be expected , nl.lch 
awaits the appearance of widely accepted definitions of the two key [ 
concepts above. Western governments have generally sought to expand 
"aggression" to cover all guerrilla activities crossing or influencing . 
events across international boundaries, thus justifying an expanded con-
cept of "self-defense" to include any and all measures necessary to 
stamp out the guerrilla movement in both its country of origin and its 
country of impact. This is one legacy of America in Vietnam. On the 
other hand, a formulation produced by the OAU focusses on liberation 
movements as "self-defense" against racism and colonialfsm which consti-
tute "permanent aggression" and therefore jus tffy any amount of force 
needed for their eradication. There are contradictions in both fornl.lla-
tions. However, it seems likely that this second task will have to be 
accompl ished within the general framework of Articles 2 (4) and 51, 
because these standards have now become so widely accepted that all states 
feel compelled to justify each use of force as self-defense against a 
putative aggressor. 
Similar to the above is the third task of legitimizing under inter-
national law the internal resistance movement to apartheid in South 
Africa (and Rhodesia and Portugal) without compelling other nations to 
legally enter into a state of war against the South African government. 
The call here is for increased jurisdiction of the international commu-
nity over a domestic government's internal policies when there is a con-
flict with a universally acclaimed principle. Presently , international juri sdiction obtains principally under a finding by the Security Council 
of a threat to international peace and security. A revised concept of 
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internationalization might initially commence with obligatory twice-
yearly widely publicized declarations by all states against apartheid 
and specifically in favor of the liberation movements or African disen-
gagement from South Africa, or their facing the sanction of an equally 
publicized presumption in law that the state refusing to make such a 
declaration thereby actively supports apartheid, with appropriate publi-
city. A concomitant of this internationalization would be the granting 
of authority to the United Nations to openly solicit funds and other 
support for those liberation movements in the name of the International 
community. And exception from the requirement of such public declara-
tion might be made for those states on the periphery of South Africa 
In danger of swift economic or military reprisal. 
A fourth task is also related to the waiting period before apartheid 
and colonialism in the area are dismembered. To the extent that South 
Africa remains white-controlled and therefore more or less hostile, 
actively or potentially, to the surrounding black states, the doctrine 
of national self-determination must be strengthened on the basis of 
community expectations that these states will be actively supported 
short of war, especially by economic means, against all attempts by 
South Africa to exert pressures and controls over their destinies. The 
Interactions between South Africa and these states, e.g. the terms of 
the recently renegotiated customs union, must become legally relevant. 
Not only must the doctrine of self-determination connote the right to 
be left free from military interference, but also the right to receive 
a proportionate share of certain needed resources to meet an identified 
threat to that nation's exercise of its self-determination. A beginning 
point might be the following rationale. It is accepted as one of the 
"rules of the game" of international life that in a defined region the 
most powerful state of that region can exercise certain kinds of influ-
ence over the smaller states without effective protest by the general 
international community, so long as the dominating state does nothing 
too outrageous. The outstanding examples, of course, are the United 
States in Latin America and the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, and 
these "rules of the game" have mostly evolved from an understanding 
between the great powers not to overtly interfere into each other's 
spheres of influence. For a regional state possessing substantial mili-
tary and economic resources, the exertion of this kind of influence is 
almost taken for granted when confined to economic strategies; in other 
words, these states acquire a tacit right to act in this manner with low 
visibility, and no doctrine of International law is considered violated 
under those conditions. Southern Africa is rapidly evolving as such 
a region with the Republic as the dominating power, and this evolution 
seems destined to continue so long as the Cape is under white rule. 
Consistent both with the doctrine of national self-determination and the 
first task of developing more effective sanctions would be a legal prin-
ciple obligating the international community to supply massive doses of 
aid to the Black Southern African states specifically to enable them to 
disengage to the extent possible from South Africa, on the grounds that 
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(1) their self-determination is overtly threatened; and (2) South Africa 
is an international outlaw - she has consistently violated a universally 
agreed principle of moral and legal behavior - and as such no longer has 
the. tacit right given to other dominating regional states to exercise 
substantial non-military influence in that region. Again, several bur-
dens of proof would have to be defined, but this is not an insuperable 
difficulty. Another possibility would be to expand the legal conse-
quences of economic coercion, especially by powerful against weak states, 
so that treaties concluded under those circumstances become legally 
voidable at the free discretion of the weak state, with economic aid 
from international sources guaranteed to offset reprisals. 
A final task for international law would be to evolve doctrines 
designed to (1) increase the volume of aid needed for the development 
of the Black Southern African states; and (2) related to the maintenance 
of national self-determination , to evolve doctrines prescri bing that 
the ultimate disposition of that aid for development rests with the 
black state, and that the latter should be free from overwhelming bila-
teral and even multilateral pressures to modify development priorities 
according to outside conceptions, and especi ally free from the threat 
of the withdrawal of such aid. Relative to (1), an immediate priority 
is to evolve a principle of obligatory aid in international law, ie., 
a tax on the rich countries for the benefit of development in the poor 
countri es with equitable allocating arrangements. With respect to (2), 
aid-mediating mechanisms on the international level are needed, similar 
to the investment mediating mechanisms provided by the World Bank's Con-
vention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes, to provide accurate 
fact-finding and to resolve disputes of final authority over the disposi-
tion of aid . This task is relevant to all developing countries, not 
only the BSA states. 
The relevance of international law to all of these needs depends 
not only on available resources and external community attitudes, but 
also on the timing of the invocation of international l egal principles 
relative to the evolving political and economic situation in Southern 
Africa. A doctrine of national self-determination must be claimed by 
those nations who would benefit before its validity can be upheld by 
international machinery; closer economic dependence on South Africa by 
the Black Southern African states could work to forestall such claims . 
Again, if local initiative is taken, the unity of black states and black 
peoples in that region could result in new regional institutions capable 
of drawing substantial international support for the porposes of develop-
ment and/or disengagement, especially in view of the ascendance of the 
regional concept in bilateral aid. 
In the last analysis, Southern Africa as a region will be subjected 
to some kind of transnational regulation of varying effectiveness, whether 
a Pax South Africana or some other. If the revolution against colonial-
ism and apartheid is successful, regulation will be needed to institu-
r 
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tfonalfze its validity and bufld a new regional public order on the 
basts of those principles fought and died for by black people, and to 
allocate scarce resources for the greatest benefit. If the revolution 
fs unsuccessful, at least fn the near future, then whatever regulation 
system enveloping the region must be manipulated by all means possible 
to secure the maximum benefit for black people . In either case, the 
system of regulation has been and will be international law, by what-
ever name ft is called. 
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